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INTRODUCTION 
Christina Aguilera’s hit song, “Beautiful,” topped the interna-
tional music charts,1 won the 2003 Grammy Award for “Best Fe-
male Pop Vocal Performance,”2 and received international critical 
acclaim for its lyrics about self-acceptance and inner beauty.3 Agui-
lera earned a GLAAD Media Award,4 and Stonewall, a UK-based 
LGBT-rights organization, labeled it the number one most empo-
wering song of the decade.5 As the track’s recording artist, Aguile-
ra’s financial gains reflected the song’s success when her album 
sold more than 4.3 million copies.6 The same can’t be said, howev-
er, for Linda Perry—the woman who wrote and published the hit.7 
In one fiscal quarter of 2012, Pandora played “Beautiful” approx-
imately 12.7 million times and yet Perry made less than $350 dol-
lars in streaming royalties.8 While record labels and recording art-
                                                                                                                            
1 See Christina Aguilera―Chart History, BILLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/
artist/299251/christina-aguilera/chart?page=1&f=379 [http://perma.cc/F3TM-9MPV] 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2015) (“Beautiful” peaked at number two on the Billboard Hot 100 in 
the United States); see also Stripped―Christina Aguilera, ALLMUSIC, 
http://www.allmusic.com/album/stripped-mw0000662221 [http://perma.cc/98YJ-
9PSF] (last visited Oct. 3, 2015) (showing that “Beautiful” reached the top spot on the 
Canadian Singles Chart). 
2 See Christina Aguilera, RECORDING ACADEMY, http://www.grammy.com/artist/
christina-aguilera [http://perma.cc/9R5Q-BSDR] (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
3 See, e.g., MARY ANNE DONOVAN, CHRISTINA AGUILERA: A BIOGRAPHY 58 (2010) 
(discussing the singer’s critical acclaim for “Beautiful” in comparison with her other 
songs). 
4 See MARGARET R. MEAD, CHRISTINA AGUILERA 10 (2012). GLAAD stands for Gay 
& Lesbian Allegiance Against Defamation. Id. 
5 See Christina Aguilera’s ‘Beautiful’ Named Most Empowering Pop Song, STAR PULSE 
(Apr. 8, 2011, 10:32 AM) http://www.starpulse.com/news/index.php/2011/04/08/
christina_aguileras_beautiful_named_mo [http://perma.cc/K65E-N8NR]. 
6 See Gary Trust, Ask Billboard: Taylor Swift Out-‘Shake’s Mariah Carey, BILLBOARD 
(Sept. 1, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-
beat/6236538/ask-billboard-taylor-swift-out-shakes-mariah-carey 
[http://perma.cc/X5KV-4QYF] (noting that the song “Beautiful” has been digitally 
purchased more than 1.5 million times.); see also DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 58 (noting 
that Aguilera was the number one Billboard Female Artist in 2003 for both the album and 
its singles with an overall total of twelve million copies sold worldwide). 
7 See Songwriting and Production, LINDA PERRY, http://www.lindaperry.com 
[http://perma.cc/JZV5-BMPL] (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“Christina Aguilera—
‘Beautiful’—Written & Produced by L. Perry”). 
8 Perry’s paycheck was for a mere $349.16; songwriters earn approximately eight 
cents for every thousand times Pandora plays one of their songs. See Burt Bacharach, 
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ists receive up to ninety-seven percent of a song’s revenue through 
royalties when the song streams over “new media,”9 such as Inter-
net radio services like Pandora or Spotify, songwriters are often 
paid as little as three percent.10 The inequality in compensation be-
tween recording artists and songwriters has never been as extreme 
as it is today.11 
Songwriters are paid through Performing Rights Organizations 
(“PROs”).12 These organizations negotiate license agreements for 
the use of songs, collect any royalties the works generate, and then 
                                                                                                                            
What the Songwriting World Needs Now, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014, 7:12 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304603704579325053186123012 
[http://perma.cc/FQD7-MK2E]. 
9 See Bailey Socha & Barbara Eber-Schmid, What is New Media?, NEW MEDIA INST., 
http://www.newmedia.org/what-is-new-media.html [http://perma.cc/4ZSW-SZSN] 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“New Media is a 21st Century catchall term used to define all 
that is related to the Internet and the interplay between technology, images, and 
sound.”). 
10 The International Council of Music Authors published the “Study Concerning Fair 
Compensation for Music Creators in the Digital Age” in 2014 to address the issue of 
compensation inequality for music copyright holders with respect to digital streaming 
services. See Pierre-E. Lalonde, Study Concerning Fair Compensation for Music Creators in 
the Digital Age, INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSIC AUTHORS (Oct. 22–23, 2014), 
http://www.ciamcreators.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/CIAM14-1172_Study_fair_
compensation_2014-05-01_EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/G2S4-T3T6]. A main conclusion 
of the study was that while major record labels are paid up to ninety-seven percent of 
digital streaming revenues, songwriters, music publishers, and other rights holders and 
administrators share “as little as 3%.” Id. at 3. The study labeled the revenue split 
between recording artists and songwriters as “grossly inequitable.” Id.; see also Rick 
Carnes, Developing a Copyright System That Works for Songwriters, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
309, 313 (2015) (noting that songwriters are “suffering deeply unfair financial 
discrimination” due to the current revenue split for digital streaming services). 
11 The introduction of digital streaming services has significantly widened the gap in 
compensation inequality. With respect to “mechanical royalties,” songwriters receive 
9.1% of a song sale’s revenue. This covers “physical phonorecords” (i.e. physical copies 
of the sound recording, such as when a consumer purchases a compact disc) or 
“permanent downloads” (such as when a consumer downloads an MP3 of a sound 
recording). See Mechanical License Royalty Rates, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD, 
http://www.copyright.gov/licensing/m200a.pdf [http://perma.cc/5M55-AEP4] (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2016); see also infra Parts I, II. As previously mentioned, songwriters make 
as little as three percent with respect to digital streaming services. See Lalonde, supra note 
10. 
12 Three major performing rights organizations exist in the United States: the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”); Broadcast Music, 
Inc. (“BMI”); and SESAC, Inc. 
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distribute the royalties back to the songwriters.13 In the 1940s, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigated the two largest PROs 
in the United States for allegedly engaging in anti-competitive con-
duct.14 To avoid the threat of prosecution, both organizations 
signed governmental consent decrees establishing various licensing 
requirements and restrictions.15 The decrees have not been up-
dated, however, in more than fifteen years.16 Neither decree has 
been revised to account for the introduction of digital technology, 
including the recent advent of Internet radio. Consequently, these 
antiquated decrees restrict the organizations’ ability to secure rea-
sonable licensing rates for performance rights in new media. As the 
music licensing system stands, record companies and recording 
artists are making considerably more money than their counter-
parts in songwriting, composing, and publishing, with respect to 
new media services.17 
                                                                                                                            
13 Michael R. Cohen, 25B WEST’S LEGAL FORMS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 23:22 
(2014) (“Since it would be virtually impossible for publishers or songwriters to monitor 
and control the large numbers of users of their songs, the enforcement and control of such 
performance rights usually falls to one of three performing rights organizations . . . .”). 
14 See, e.g., Noel L. Hillman, Intractable Consent: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of 
the Aging Consent Decrees in United States v. ASCAP and United States v. BMI, 8 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 733, 743 (1998) (detailing how and why the 
two largest domestic PROs—ASCAP and BMI—entered into governmental consent 
decrees). 
15 The government often settles civil antitrust litigation outside of trial by having 
defendants enter into a consent decree to remedy the alleged anti-competitive conduct. 
See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, Civ. Action No. 41-
1395 (WCC) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 11, 2001) (Second Amended Final Judgment), [hereinafter 
ASCAP Consent Decree]; United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., No. 64-Civ-3787 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994) (Amended Final Judgment), [hereinafter BMI Consent 
Decree]; see also JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 4:8 (2d ed.). 
16 The ASCAP Consent Decree was last updated in 2001, whereas BMI’s was last 
updated in 1994. See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra 
note 15. 
17 Taylor Swift pulled her newest album, 1989, from Spotify out of fear that allowing 
free listening through the service would hurt sales. See Doug Gross, Songwriters: Spotify 
Doesn’t Pay Off . . . Unless You’re a Taylor Swift, CNN (Nov. 13, 2014, 11:58 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/12/tech/web/spotify-pay-musicians [http://perma.cc/
Y9ER-BNR8]. She was on track, however, to make approximately six million dollars in 
2014 from allowing her songs to play on the platform. Id. Comparatively, the songwriters 
of Jon Bon Jovi’s famed hit, “Livin’ on a Prayer” made only $110.00 for more than 6.5 
million plays on the same platform. Id. 
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In order to guarantee reasonable fees for songwriters, compos-
ers, and publishers, the consent decrees18 must undergo critical 
reform to account for how music is licensed in new media.19 Part I 
of this Note will provide background on the mechanics of music 
licensing, both traditional and through modern mediums, in order 
to explain why the two largest PROs initially entered into govern-
mental consent decrees. Part II will discuss recent judicial determi-
nations of “reasonable” licensing rates for public performances in 
new media and demonstrate the discrepancy in compensation be-
tween songwriters and their sound recording counterparts, namely 
record companies and recording artists. Finally, Part III will argue 
that the solution to this problem is through consent decree reform. 
The decrees should be modified to allow songwriters to withdraw 
their digital rights in order to separately license songs in new me-
dia. A new PRO should then emerge in the market place to account 
solely for public performance rights in new media, leaving tradi-
tional licensing to the existing PROs. Additionally, the current 
judicial process for setting rates, known as the “rate court” sys-
tem, should be replaced with expedited, binding arbitration. Mak-
ing these important changes to the music-licensing system will 
work towards bridging the gap in compensation inequality between 
songwriters and recording artists. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE MECHANICS OF MUSIC LICENSING 
A. Copyrighting Music 
Copyright protection is at the core of music licensing and has 
evolved over time with the technological developments in music 
                                                                                                                            
18 The ASCAP and BMI consent decrees are substantially similar. This Note will 
address making substantive changes to both decrees and will refer to them collectively as 
“the consent decrees.” The Antitrust Division of the DOJ solicited public comments on 
reforming the decrees in 2014 and is currently considering modification. See ANTITRUST 
CONSENT DECREE REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascap-
bmi-decree-review.html [http://perma.cc/M8AA-YW3L] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
19 For ease of reference, the types of artists represented by PROs (namely songwriters, 
lyricists, composers, and publishers) will be referred to in this Note collectively as 
“songwriters.” 
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distribution.20 Under the United States Constitution, Congress has 
the authority to pass legislation to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts” by providing authors and inventors with 
exclusive rights to their works for a limited period of time.21 Al-
though the first federal copyright act passed in 1790, the only way 
songwriters could legally protect their work at the time was by 
physically printing the composition on paper and then copyrighting 
the paper as a “book.”22 The term “musical compositions” was 
not added to the list of statutorily protected works until Congress 
amended the copyright legislation in 1831.23 
Decades later, in 1897, further legislative reform allowed for the 
protection of “public performances” of musical compositions, 
namely when someone other than the copyright holder performs 
the work in a public or private venue.24 As technology evolved and 
these performances could be recorded and distributed through 
“phonorecords,” Congress accordingly amended the law again in 
1909 to account for “mechanical” reproductions of music.25 Con-
sequently, there is a legal distinction between “musical works” and 
“sound recordings” and the type of protection each musical cate-
gory is granted under modern copyright law. 
The most recent major reform of U.S. copyright law occurred 
in 1976 with the Copyright Act, and the legislation remains largely 
unchanged to date.26 Eight types of “works of authorship” are ex-
pressly listed as receiving protection, two of which are “musical 
                                                                                                                            
20 See generally COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 
(Feb. 2015), http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-
marketplace.pdf [http://perma.cc/44KE-W4GE] [hereinafter MUSIC MARKETPLACE]. 
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
22 See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; see also Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 
1000 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (“A book within the statute need not be a book in the common 
and ordinary acceptation of the word . . . it may be printed only on one sheet, as the words 
of a song or the music accompanying it.”). 
23 See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. 
24 See Zvi S. Rosen, The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A Prehistory of the Exclusive Right 
of Public Performance for Musical Compositions, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1157, 1158 
(2007) (providing a comprehensive history of how public performances gained copyright 
protection in the 1880’s and noting “the right to exclusive public performance of a 
musical composition was established by statute in 1897”). 
25 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075–76. 
26 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006); see also Kurt E. Kruckeberg, Copyright “Band-AIDS” 
and the Future of Reform, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1545, 1548 (2011). 
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works” and “sound recordings.”27 The “musical works” classifi-
cation pertains to the song’s composition and any accompanying 
lyrics, as created by the songwriter and/or publisher.28 Conversely, 
a “sound recording” is an individual performance of the “musical 
work” recorded in a fixed medium, such as a compact disc (“CD”) 
or digital MP3 file.29 These two forms of authorship, although both 
included in the “musical works” category, receive different copy-
right protections and can be owned collectively by one party, or 
individually by separate parties.30 
Copyright holders of “musical works” obtain certain exclusive 
rights, including the right to authorize others to make reproduc-
tions of their work.31 Known as the “mechanical right,” this in-
cludes such methods of reproduction as reprinting sheet music of 
the composition or creating a CD.32 Copyright holders of “musical 
works” can also authorize others to create derivatives of their 
work, such as writing a new song based on the original composition 
or creating a musical arrangement containing the work.33 Although 
a “synchronization right” is not expressly listed in the Copyright 
Act, it is an accepted form of derivative work within the music in-
dustry.34 It involves synchronizing a musical work in timed relation 
to another medium, such as setting a song to audiovisual material 
                                                                                                                            
27 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include . . . (1) literary works; (2) musical 
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound 
recordings; and (8) architectural works.”); see also Joshua P. Binder, Current Developments 
of Public Performance Rights for Sound Recordings Transmitted Online: You Push Play, but 
Who Gets Paid?, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (providing an in-depth explanation 
of the difference between “musical works” and “sound recordings”). 
28 Id. 
29 17 U.S.C. § 114. 
30 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 18. 
31 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
32 See id.; MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 34. 
33 17 U.S.C. § 106(2); see also COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE WORKS AND COMPILATIONS, 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (Oct. 2013), http://copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf [http://perma
.cc/4BNV-VZ77]. 
34 17 U.S.C. § 106(2); see, e.g., Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors 
& Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The ‘synch’ right is a form of the 
reproduction right also created by statute as one of the exclusive rights enjoyed by the 
copyright owner.”). 
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to create a music video.35 Copyright holders can also authorize pub-
lic display of a musical work, such as printing song lyrics in an ad-
vertisement or posting them to a webpage.36 The right to perform a 
work publicly, either live or by broadcasting a recording, is known 
as the “public performance right” and is the main focus of this 
Note.37 
The copyright owner of a “sound recording” was not originally 
entitled to any type of performance right.38 This changed with the 
1995 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act 
(“DPRSRA”), which added a new exclusive right known as the 
“digital performance right.”39 The change was enacted in response 
to how music users were consuming music in relation to emerging 
technology (i.e., listening to streaming services online rather than 
actually purchasing physical copies or downloads of songs).40 Con-
sequently, copyright owners of sound recordings now have many of 
the same exclusive rights under the Copyright Act as those owning 
“musical works,” including the right to make or distribute copies 
and/or to create derivative works.41 If, for example, Prince’s hit 
song, “Stand Back” plays over digital radio, Stevie Nicks is en-
titled to collect royalties for the performance right because she 
wrote it.42 Thanks to the DPRSA, Prince and his record label can 
also collect royalties for the digital performance right because he is 
the featured artist on the track.43 
                                                                                                                            
35 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 25. 
36 See id.; see also AL & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 692–93 (4th ed. 2010); 
17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
37 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). 
38 See Eric M. Jenniges, Waves of Concern: Copyright Issues in Satellite Radio, 22 GA. ST. 
U.L. REV. 969, 973 (2006). 
39 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 4, 
109 Stat. 336, 344–48; see, e.g., Tomomi Harkey, Bonneville International Corp. v. Peters: 
Considering Copyright Rules to Facilitate Licensing for Webcasting, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
625, 633–36 (2005) (outlining the evolution of the “digital performance right”). 
40 See Jenniges, supra note 38, at 973–74. 
41 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(3), (6). 
42 See Tia Williams, Wait, Who Wrote That? 15 Shocking Songwriters Behind Pop Hits, 
VH1 (Mar. 27, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.vh1.com/celebrity/2013-03-27/surprising-
songwriters [http://perma.cc/7YF2-PTZJ]. 
43 Id. 
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The chart below demonstrates the type of licenses generally re-
quired for common forms of music usage:  
 
Required License(s) 
Music 
Usage 
Mechanical 
(a.k.a. Print) 
Synchro-
nization 
Public 
Performance 
Digital 
Performance 
Creating 
a CD 
•    
MP3 
Distribution 
•   • 
Internet 
Radio   • • 
Karaoke  • • • 
Live 
Performance 
  •  
Music Video • • •  
Printing 
Sheet Music 
•    
Publishing 
Song Lyrics 
•    
Ringtones    • 
Traditional 
AM/FM 
Radio44 
No license required in the United States 
Use in Film • • •  
Use in 
Television 
 • •  
                                                                                                                            
44 Transmitting a musical work over radio is considered exempt from copyright 
infringement and thus does not require the payment of royalties because such 
performances are deemed to be “promotional tools” used to drive sales. Copyright law 
has a “non-subscription broadcast” exception. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A)(iii); see also 
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 485 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[S]tatutory 
exemption of ‘nonsubscription broadcast transmissions’ from digital audio transmission 
performance copyright coverage does not cover station’s simultaneous Internet streaming 
of its AM/FM broadcast signals.”). Even after the 1995 DPRSRA, traditional and radio 
broadcasters continue to perform sound recordings without having to pay royalties for 
digital performance rights “even if they convert their signal to digital form.” ROBERT P. 
MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 574–78 (4th ed. 
2006). 
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B. The Multifaceted Licensing Process 
As a result of having two separate types of musical works and 
various exclusive rights attached to each under the law, there are 
numerous ways in which such works can be licensed.45 The music 
industry relies on a variety of different organizations and entities to 
license these works and thus to administer the respective rights and 
royalties.46 As previously mentioned, the “public performance 
right” for musical works first gained legal protection in 1897.47 
Even at a time when publicly performing a song was the only way in 
which a copyright holder could derive profit from this right (in 
comparison to modern day where songs can be broadcast through 
multiple mediums to constitute a public performance), the “sheer 
number and fleeting nature” of such public performances made it 
extremely difficult for copyright owners to negotiate individually 
with each user or to detect possible infringement.48 Resultantly, 
PROs were established to simplify the process and address the lo-
gistical issue of having each performance venue negotiate separate-
ly with each copyright holder.49 The first major PRO, the American 
Society of Composers and Music Publishers (“ASCAP”), was es-
tablished in 1914.50 Two others, Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”)51 
and SESAC, Inc. (“SESAC”),52 were created in the 1930s. Today, 
                                                                                                                            
45 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 18 (noting that the “musical work” and 
“sound recording” are separately protected works of authorship and can thus be 
separately owned and licensed under copyright law). 
46 Id. at 32. 
47 See Rosen, supra note 24. 
48 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 32. 
49 See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(“[T]here are far too many musical works . . . to make it realistic to undertake individual 
negotiations; and as to some works, the copyright holder may not be identified easily.”). 
50 American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Comment Letter 
Regarding Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307803.pdf [http://perma.cc/
PH2C-F8ZX] [hereinafter ASCAP Comment]. 
51 BMI was created in 1939. See Broadcast Music, Inc., Comment Letter on Review of 
Consent Decree in United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://www.bmi.com/pdfs/advocacy/bmi_public_comments_to_doj.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/UEQ6-JHKV] [hereinafter BMI Comment]. 
52 See About Us, SESAC, http://www.sesac.com/About/About.aspx [http://perma.cc/
6XCC-PYSJ] (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
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the three PRO repertories account for the licensing of nearly every 
copyrighted musical composition in the United States.53 
Traditionally, the music licensing process was fairly 
straightforward. Songwriters would join a PRO, which would nego-
tiate license agreements with various venues for the use of their 
music, including entities such as bars, restaurants, live perfor-
mance venues, and television stations (in order to use songs in pro-
gramming and commercials).54 The PROs would then collect the 
fees generated by any public performances and distribute the mon-
ey back to the songwriters.55 The process has since become more 
complicated, however, with the advent of technology and the cor-
responding creation of new mediums for broadcasting music. To-
day, for example, an Internet radio service must be licensed in or-
der for consumers to play any copyrighted songs.56 
To address varying needs, PROs provide different types of li-
censes.57 Collective Licenses, known as Blanket Licenses, are the 
most common type and allow a licensee to perform all of the songs 
in the particular PRO’s repertory an unlimited amount of times 
and for a fixed fee.58 This type of license is common for venues like 
bars, restaurants, retail stores, and television stations.59 Per-
program or per-segment licenses (“PPL”) also authorize the use of 
all songs, but are effectively a discount off the Blanket License.60 
The licensee is authorized to use all songs in the PRO’s repertory 
for specific programs or parts of programming, in exchange for a 
flat fee or percentage of that program’s advertising revenue.61 The 
                                                                                                                            
53 See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 188. Individuals and entities are still free, 
however, to obtain “direct licenses” straight from the copyright holder and/or “source 
licenses” sold directly from the song’s producer. Id. at 190. 
54 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 20. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 190; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
59 See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 189–90. 
60 See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 157 F.R.D. 173, 
178 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
61 Id. (“[The PPL] amounts to a mini-blanket license in that it permits the licensee to 
use as much ASCAP music as it wishes . . . [while] . . . pay[ing] fees only for those 
programs that actually use such ASCAP music.”). 
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PPL requires more detailed reporting information, such as specify-
ing the music selected, the usage dates and program-specific in-
formation.62 
When previews for Universal Pictures’ Fifty Shades of Grey 
played on television, for example, each station that featured the 
advertisement needed to ensure that the songs included in the pre-
view were within its licensing agreements. One of the trailers fea-
tured Beyoncé’s “Haunted,” and because she is a member of 
ASCAP, the stations were required to have some type of ASCAP 
licensing agreement in place.63 
Whereas PROs are charged with the public performance right 
with respect to “musical works,” a separate entity covers the right 
for “sound recordings.”64 Copyright holders for sound recordings 
are entitled to public performance royalties, but only for digital au-
dio transmissions.65 This includes Internet services that “stream” 
or “webcast” music, meaning a platform that allows a user to listen 
to a song without leaving a useable copy on his or her computer.66 
These transmissions are then licensed differently, according to 
whether they are transmitted through interactive or non-interactive 
streaming services.67 A section 114 statutory license applies to non-
interactive digital music services, such as free and paid Internet 
radio services.68 Royalty rates and terms for such licenses are han-
dled by the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”), which is comprised 
of three administrative judges appointed by the Librarian of Con-
                                                                                                                            
62 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 33. 
63 See, e.g., ASCAP Members Win Big at the Grammys, ASCAP, 
http://www.ascap.com/playback/2015/02/action/2015-ascap-grammy-winners 
[http://perma.cc/8ZXC-27PZ] (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (noting that Beyoncé won three 
Grammys, the most of any ASCAP member in 2015). 
64 See About, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about 
[http://perma.cc/B3SR-2U2P] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016). 
65 See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 
§ 4, 109 Stat. 336. 
66 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f), (g) (2006). 
67 See id. §§ 112, 114. 
68 It also applies to “preexisting” satellite radio services and music subscription 
services, meaning those that existed prior to July 1, 1998. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), (c). 
Sirius XM is the only preexisting satellite service, and Music Choice and Muzak are the 
only preexisting subscription services. See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 49. 
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gress.69 Similarly, a section 112 statutory license addresses server 
reproductions of such sound recordings, known as “ephemeral re-
cordings,” and is also governed by the CRB.70 Limitations on these 
licenses include not being able to announce in advance a schedule 
of songs that will be played, nor the ability to play a certain song 
more than a specified number of times in a particular time limit.71 
The CRB does not, however, function as a PRO to collect and 
distribute royalties.72 The Recording Industry Association of 
America created a non-profit PRO called SoundExchange in 
2000.73 It became an independent entity in 2003 and is designated 
by the U.S. Copyright Office to “collect and distribute digital per-
formance royalties” for all digital audio transmissions of sound re-
cordings.74 The Copyright Act specifies royalty distribution in sec-
tion 114: 50% to the copyright owner of the sound recording, 45% to 
the recording artist, 2.5% to an agent representing non-featured vo-
calists on the record, and 2% to an agent representing the featured 
vocalists.75 Under section 112, royalties go directly to the sound 
recording’s copyright owner.76 The distinction between interactive 
and non-interactive (i.e., radio-style) services has, however, been 
the subject of considerable debate. Section 114 provides that a ser-
vice is interactive if it allows the user to access the transmission of 
a program “specifically created for the recipient,” or the transmis-
sion of a recording “which is selected by or on behalf of the reci-
                                                                                                                            
69 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801–805; see also Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341. 
70 See 17 U.S.C. § 112; see also 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 5:63 
(2014) (defining “ephemeral recordings” as “copies or phonorecords of a work made for 
purposes of later transmission by a broadcasting organization legally entitled to transmit 
the work”). 
71 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(B)–(C). 
72 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 47. 
73 Id. 
74 SoundExchange deducts its costs before distributing royalties. See id.; see also Erich 
Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty Board’s March 2007 Rate 
Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet Radio?, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 268 (2008). 
75 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2); see also About Digital Royalties, SOUNDEXCHANGE, 
http://www.soundexchange.com/artist-copyright-owner/digital-royalties/ 
[http://perma.cc/7SUL-A55T] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 112(e). 
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pient.”77 In Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., a group of 
record companies filed suit against a webcasting service providing 
an Internet radio platform to listeners.78 The action challenged 
whether the radio service, which provided users with “individua-
lized radio stations” created based on the users’ listening habits 
and the user’s ratings of songs and artists, was interactive within 
the meaning of the statute.79 Although users of the service are not 
directly able to select songs, the court considered whether or not 
the service could be considered “specially created” for the user 
based on the rating-scheme.80 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that the service was not “interactive,” 
because the webcasting service did “not provide sufficient control 
to users such that playlists are so predictable that users will choose 
to listen to the webcast in lieu of purchasing music.”81 As a result 
of the ruling, Internet radio services such as Pandora are able to 
obtain statutory licenses as noninteractive services for public per-
formances of sound recordings.82 
Every five years, the CRB conducts rate-setting procedures for 
sections 112 and 114 statutory licenses.83 These rates are appealable 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.84 To facilitate voluntary industry agreements, the CRB first 
allows parties to negotiate and attempt to reach a settlement.85 The 
CRB can then accept the settlement either partially or in full, or 
proceed to conduct its own rate-setting determination in the event 
that the parties cannot reach an agreement.86 Services that don’t 
fall under sections 112 or 114, and are thus “interactive,” must ob-
tain direct licenses from copyright holders, which are negotiated 
                                                                                                                            
77 See id. § 114(j)(7). 
78 578 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 2009). 
79 Id. at 149–50; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7). 
80 See Arista Records, 578 F.3d at 161. 
81 The Second Circuit noted Congress’ intent in making the distinction was to ensure 
that services which ran the risk of diminishing record sales be subject to stricter licensing 
arrangements. Id. at 162. 
82 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 49. 
83 See 17 U.S.C. § 804(b). 
84 See id. § 803(d)(1). 
85 See id. § 803(b)(1)–(3). 
86 See id. §§ 801(b)(7), 803(b)(6). 
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independently from the CRB.87 Consequently, the terms of such 
licenses can be vastly different from those reached under statutory 
agreements.88 This allows record companies to negotiate for incen-
tives such as fee advances and company stock as contract consider-
ation.89 
The chart below demonstrates the many facets of the music li-
censing process. The performance rights categories are highlighted 
in yellow as they are the focus of this Note: 
C. Governmental Intervention: ASCAP & BMI’s Consent Decrees 
ASCAP and BMI, the two largest American PROs, are subject 
to governmental oversight through the form of consent decrees.90 
A consent decree is an agreement between the government and a 
                                                                                                                            
87 See id. § 114(d)(3)(C). 
88 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 52. 
89 Major record companies collectively received eighteen percent of Spotify shares as 
consideration in negotiating direct licensing agreements for the interactive service. See 
Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: The Real Reason Why the Major Labels Love Spotify, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2009/
aug/17/major-labels-spotify [http://perma.cc/7VLR-FMPN]; see also Hannah Karp, 
Artists Press for Their Share, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
artists-press-for-their-share-1405905178 [http://perma.cc/5MAL-25B4] (noting that 
Google, Inc. paid Warner Music Group an advance of $400 million to license the label’s 
free YouTube site and a paid YouTube subscription service, which had not yet been 
released). 
90 See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; see also BMI Consent Decree, supra note 
15. 
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party accused of committing some type of unlawful conduct.91 The 
party accused of committing the unlawful conduct signs the decree, 
and thus agrees to its terms, without admitting liability.92 This type 
of agreement has the same “force and effect” as any other judg-
ment.93 The DOJ distinguishes between two types of consent de-
crees: “perpetual final judgments,” which are namely consent de-
crees entered into before 1979, and decrees with “sunset provi-
sions,” which are post-1979 decrees that automatically terminate 
on a certain date.94 
ASCAP started as a non-profit in 1914 and its repertory grew 
substantially in the 1920s when the radio started broadcasting mu-
sic.95 A second PRO, SESAC, was established in 1930 as a for-
profit entity but remained small and did not pose substantial com-
petition in the industry.96 Consequently, the radio industry created 
BMI, a third PRO, as direct competition for ASCAP in 1939.97 For 
many years, ASCAP and BMI only offered blanket licenses to their 
repertoires and had the exclusive rights to their members’ public 
performance rights, prohibiting members from negotiating any di-
rect licensing agreements.98 Soon, however, the DOJ grew con-
cerned that the PROs were engaging in anticompetitive conduct 
and initiated antitrust proceedings against both organizations.99 
In 1941, the DOJ filed a complaint against ASCAP, alleging that 
its blanket license was an illegal restraint of trade under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, “eliminating competition among ASCAP’s 
                                                                                                                            
91 See 35B C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 1149 (2015). 
92 See id. 
93 See id.; see, e.g., Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 
2014). 
94 Modern consent decrees typically terminate within ten years. See ANTITRUST 
DIVISION MANUAL III-146, DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV. (5th ed. 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/download [http://perma.cc/WKQ4-69S6] (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
95 See Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in 
Broadcasting, 24 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 349, 354 (2001). 
96 See id. 
97 See id.; see also BMI Comment, supra note 51 (discussing the history of BMI). 
98 See MUSIC MARKETPLACE, supra note 20, at 35–36. 
99 See id. at 36; see, e.g., United States v. Broad. Music Inc., 1966 Tr. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (settling the dispute by consent decree); United States v. Am. 
Soc’y Composers, Authors & Publishers (United States v. ASCAP), 1941 Tr. Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (settling the matter by consent decree). 
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member-affiliates and allowing them to fix prices for their mu-
sic.”100 Rather than conceding liability, ASCAP agreed to enter 
into a non-sunset provision “perpetual final judgment” consent 
decree.101 The decree imposed three requirements: (1) to offer a 
PPL as an alternative to the blanket license; (2) to allow broadcas-
ters to enter into license agreements, upon request; and (3) to allow 
membership to any artist who had composed at least one musical 
work.102 
The decree was amended in 1950 in response to two lawsuits, 
each involving music licensing for movie theatres. In the first, Al-
den-Rochelle v. ASCAP,103 164 plaintiffs operating more than 200 
movie theatres brought suit against ASCAP, alleging violations of 
both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,104 for restraint of trade 
and monopolistic conduct. ASCAP had entered into agreements 
with its members that prohibited them from assigning their per-
forming rights directly to movie producers instead of forcing them 
to go through the PRO.105 Further, the agreements with movie dis-
tributors only allowed a film, with ASCAP licensed material to be 
shown for profit in theatres that also held ASCAP licenses.106 The 
Court boldly held that “[a]lmost every part of the [ASCAP] struc-
ture, almost all of [ASCAP]’s activities in licensing motion picture 
theatres, involve a violation of the anti-trust laws.”107 The plaintiffs 
were awarded injunctive relief.108 
The second case, M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, was conversely 
brought by members of ASCAP against a group of movie thea-
                                                                                                                            
100 See Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 197–98 (2014) (providing a 
history of the early antitrust litigation against ASCAP). Price-fixing agreements, whereby 
competing sellers agree to maintain the same prices, are per se violations of the Sherman 
Act. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) (“The 
anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial 
invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some.”). 
101 See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 197. 
102 United States v. Am. Soc’y of Authors, Composers & Publishers, 870 F. Supp 1211, 
1212–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing United States v. ASCAP, 1941 Tr. Cas. (CCH), ¶ 56,104). 
103 80 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), amended by 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
104 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2004). 
105 Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 891. 
106 Id. at 892. 
107 Id. at 893. 
108 Id. at 900. 
510 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:493 
 
tres.109 The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief against 
the theatres for showing films featuring their material without first 
obtaining an ASCAP blanket license.110 The Court denied relief on 
the grounds that ASCAP was violating both sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, and thus, even the plaintiffs were violating antitrust 
law.111 
The first amendment to ASCAP’s decree, which occurred in 
1950, added a provision of particular importance to this Note.112 It 
provided that, if ASCAP and one of its licensees could not reach an 
agreement with respect to setting a rate, the licensee could apply 
for a “rate court” proceeding for a judicial determination of a rea-
sonable fee, with ASCAP bearing the burden of proof as to reason-
ableness.113 BMI did not sign its consent decree until 1966, but the 
decree’s creation followed a similar path as ASCAP’s.114 The de-
cree’s terms are virtually identical and also provide for judicial rate 
setting, with BMI also bearing the burden of proof as to reasona-
bleness.115 
Despite both PROs entering into consent decrees with nearly 
identical terms, parties continued to bring antitrust challenges 
based on the propensity of blanket licenses. In 1975, Columbia 
Broadcasting System sued ASCAP, BMI, and all respective mem-
bers and affiliates.116 Although the district court upheld the blanket 
                                                                                                                            
109 80 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Minn. 1948). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 850. 
112 See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. Civ. A. 
42-245, 1950 WL 42273, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1950). 
113 These “rate courts” sit in the Southern District of New York. See id; see also 
Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 198 (2014). 
114 For a historical detail of BMI’s path towards signing its DOJ consent decree as well 
as further background on both decrees, see Janet L. Avery, The Struggle over Performing 
Rights to Music: BMI and ASCAP vs. Cable Television, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 47, 
49 (1991). 
115 BMI’s consent decree also requires granting PPLs as an alternative to blanket 
licenses, admitting any songwriter with more than one published work, and prohibiting 
the prevention of direct licensing. It was amended in 1994 to allow either BMI or its 
licensees to apply to the rate court for a judicial determination of a reasonable fee. See 
United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64 Civ. 3787, 1994 WL 901652, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 18, 1994); BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15. 
116 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 
400 F. Supp. 737, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
2016] “IT’S BEEN A HARD DAY’S NIGHT” FOR SONGWRITERS 511 
 
licenses, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that they constituted 
illegal price fixing and were a per se violation of federal antitrust 
law.117 The Supreme Court reversed again, however, agreeing with 
the district court that blanket licenses were a practical solution to 
an incredibly complex marketplace where thousands of copyright 
holders and millions of compositions must be efficiently licensed.118 
On remand, the Second Circuit held that the blanket licenses were 
not anti-competitive because viable alternatives, such as the PPL, 
were guaranteed to licensees through the two consent decrees.119 
The third American PRO, SESAC, is considerably smaller than 
both ASCAP and BMI and operates as a for-profit entity owned 
fully by investors.120 Although information is not publicly reported, 
SESAC is understood to have a market share in the single digit 
range.121 SESAC faced its first antitrust dispute in 2014 when fifty 
local television stations filed a class action lawsuit against the 
PRO.122 The plaintiffs argued it was unfeasible to avoid obtaining 
licenses for SESAC’s repertory because its body of musical works 
had grown so large and included many “ubiquitous” songs that 
these compositions were inevitably among those the TV shows the 
stations wanted to air.123 The plaintiffs further contended that 
SESAC did not offer a viable alternative to its blanket license, as 
                                                                                                                            
117 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 
562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977). 
118 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
119 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 
620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, 
Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding the blanket license is not a 
restraint on trade because viable alternatives, such as PLLs and direct licensing, exist); 
Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Broad. Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1991) 
(holding a “realistically available alternative” to the blanket license exists). 
120 See Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
121 See In re Application of MobiTv, Inc. (MobiTV I), 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d sub nom. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. 
MobiTV, Incorporation (MobiTV II), 681 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2012). 
122 See Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 185–86. 
123 From 1995 to 2000, SESAC offered an industry-wide blanket license to television 
stations. The license was extended from 2001 to 2004 but included a provision that any 
disputes would be settled through arbitration. In 2005, when negotiations couldn’t be 
reached with the stations, SESAC started negotiating individually with licensees. The 
new licenses increased in price by ten percent and modified the PLL alternative. 
Consequently, no station continued with a PLL prior to the lawsuit, compared with 180 
stations that used it in 2005. Id. at 186, 190–94. 
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the cost of obtaining a PPL had drastically increased and the PRO 
imposed penalties for engaging in direct licensing.124 In October 
2014, SESAC entered into a settlement agreement with the sta-
tions.125 Terms included the payment of $58.5 million to the televi-
sion stations and for SESAC to include a viable PPL as an alterna-
tive to the blanket license, beginning in 2016.126 
II. THE “RATE COURTS”: SETTING “REASONABLE” RATES 
TO LICENSE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN NEW MEDIA 
According to both ASCAP and BMI’s consent decrees, parties 
can request a judicial determination of rates if they cannot reach a 
negotiated agreement.127 Although the “rate court” system has 
been in place for decades, it was not until recent years that it be-
came a commonly used venue.128 With the advent of new media, an 
increasing number of license-seekers have relied upon judicial rate 
setting.129 These parties have taken claims to the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York 
(“S.D.N.Y.”) (and some, on appeal, to the Second Circuit) to seek 
rate court intervention in setting licensing fees with both ASCAP 
and BMI.130 Consequently, the S.D.N.Y. has been instrumental in 
deciding what a “reasonable” license fee should be in the online 
world.131 
                                                                                                                            
124 Id. at 192–93. 
125 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for 
Preliminary Approval of Settlement at 1–2, 5, Meredith Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d at 180. 
126 The S.D.N.Y. approved the settlement in February 2015. Approximately $16 million 
was designated towards reimbursing attorneys fees and expenses while the remaining 
$42.5 million was allocated to the local stations in the settlement class as compensation 
for the “alleged overcharges they paid since 2008.” See Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, 
87 F. Supp. 3d 650, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
127 See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15. 
128 Prior to 2000, ASCAP had only experienced seven rate court proceedings. BMI’s 
first proceeding was in 2001. See Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining in the Shadow of Rate-Setting 
Courts, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 310 (2009). 
129 See Todd Brabec & Jeffrey Brabec, Online Music Licensing, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 
35 (2011); see also United States v. Broad. Music, Inc. (Music Choice II), 316 F.3d 189, 194 
(2d Cir. 2003) (noting that BMI’s first rate court case to appeal to the Second Circuit was 
in 2003). 
130 See Brabec & Brabec, supra note 129, at 35. 
131 Id. 
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The ASCAP and BMI consent decrees do not expressly define 
“reasonable” or the process by which the PROs must prove that 
their determination of rates is reasonable.132 Consequently, the 
judicial determination is often a complicated task: 
The challenges of [determining a fair market rate for 
a blanket music license] include discerning a rate 
that will give composers an economic incentive to 
keep enriching our lives with music, that avoids 
compensating composers for contributions made by 
others either to the creative work or to the delivery 
of that work to the public, and that does not create 
distorting incentives in the marketplace that will 
improperly affect the choices made by composers, 
inventors, investors, consumers and other economic 
players.133 
Additionally, the fact that judicial rate setting is extremely rare 
with respect to intellectual property matters does not make the task 
any easier, as judges lack analogous standards for rate calculation 
and justification.134 
A well-established procedure has, however, developed through 
recent rate court precedent in proceedings with both PROs.135 To 
determine a reasonable fee, the court attempts to make a determi-
nation of the fair market value (i.e., “the price that a willing buyer 
and a willing seller would agree to in an arm’s length transac-
tion.”).136 Each party sets forth a benchmark and the court assigns 
a rate by considering factors such as: the parties’ comparability, the 
comparability of the rights in question, and the similarity in eco-
nomic circumstances affecting each party and the earlier litigants 
                                                                                                                            
132 See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15. 
133 See In re Pandora Media, Inc. (In re Pandora II), 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (quoting MobiTV I, 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
MobiTV II, 681 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2012)); see also MOBITV, https://www.mobitv.com 
[http://perma.cc/S9U9-7UBF] (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
134 See Crane, supra note 128, at 312. 
135 See Music Choice II, 316 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no reason why the 
approach for determining a BMI license’s reasonable rate should differ from the 
procedure for determining an ASCAP rate court case). 
136 Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc. 
(ASCAP v. Showtime), 912 F.2d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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on which they are basing their calculations.137 The issue the court 
often faces is that these benchmarks are vastly different.138 The 
“most important”139 factor for courts to consider is “the degree to 
which the assertedly analogous market under examination reflects 
an adequate degree of competition to justify reliance on agreements 
that it has spawned.”140 If either party is dissatisfied, the case can 
go to the Second Circuit on appeal, where the court will determine 
if S.D.N.Y. used an “erroneous standard” by either: (1) relying on 
legally impermissible factors; (2) failing to give consideration to 
legally relevant factors; (3) applying incorrect legal standards; or 
(4) misapplying correct legal standards.141 Three recent rate court 
cases have been particularly significant in demonstrating how the 
judiciary is setting licensing rates for new media services. In all 
three cases, the rate court assigned rates far below what the PROs 
ideally requested and provided as their benchmarks. 
A. ASCAP Versus MobiTV 
MobiTv, Inc. (“MobiTV”) is an entity that purchases pro-
gramming from cable networks and then transmits it to wireless 
carriers so consumers can access the content on mobile devices, 
like cellphones and tablets.142 In 2003, MobiTV applied to ASCAP 
for a “through-to-the-audience” (“TTTA”)143 blanket license to 
                                                                                                                            
137 United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. Civ. 13-95 
(WCC), 1993 WL 60687, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1993), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 157 
F.R.D. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 ASCAP v. Showtime, 912 F.2d at 577. 
141 Id. For example, in Music Choice II, BMI’s benchmark was 3.75% of wholesale 
revenue and the S.D.N.Y. rate court set the licensing fee at 1.75% (approximately half of 
what the parties had agreed to in their existing contract and half of what BMI had recently 
agreed to with a competitor). 316 F.3d. 189, 190 (2003). The Court reasoned that basing 
the rate on wholesale revenue was inappropriate. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed 
the S.D.N.Y. decision stating, “what retail customers pay to receive the product or 
service in question . . . seems to us to be an excellent indicator of its fair market value.” 
See id. at 195. 
142 See MobiTV I, 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. MobiTV II, 
681 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2012). 
143 Cable networks and over-the-air broadcasters are entitled to seek a TTTA from 
ASCAP. The Second Circuit has held that cable program suppliers are “telecasting 
networks” within the meaning of ASCAP’s consent decree and are entitled to seek 
licenses that cover content transmitted not only to local cable system operators but also 
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cover its content, including songs featured in music videos and on 
radio-style audio channels.144 The parties were unable to agree on 
which revenue base the fee should be calculated, disagreeing over 
whether the fee should be based upon the retail revenue received 
by the wireless carriers MobiTV contracts with, or the amounts 
MobiTV pays to its content providers.145 Further, their benchmark 
proposal of the rates to be applied to the revenue base differed by 
tens of millions of dollars.146 
ASCAP petitioned the rate court in 2008 and both sides pre-
sented testimony in support of their respective benchmarks.147 
ASCAP argued that the rate should be based on total revenues, in-
cluding revenue that wireless carriers receive from data plans be-
cause consumers are enticed to buy the data plans in order to view 
audiovisual content on their mobile devices.148 In support of Mo-
biTV, an expert witness calculated its benchmark based on a fee 
established in a comparable proceeding with AOL.149 ASCAP’s 
proposal conformed to the traditional three-tiered system used in 
traditional TTTA’s in the early 1990s, which is established based 
on the music intensity of the programming and classifies it as either 
(1) music intensive; (2) general entertainment; or (3) news and 
sports.150 MobiTV did not disagree with the three-tiered system, 
but argued that the rates should be based on wholesale revenue, 
namely what it pays networks for content and receives in return 
from wireless carriers to feature its services.151 
                                                                                                                            
directly to the viewer. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 782 F. Supp. 778, 808–17 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 956 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1992). 
144 See MobiTV I, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
145 Id. at 209. 
146 Id. 
147 ASCAP presented testimony from four of its employees, two expert witnesses and 
two composers. MobiTV countered with testimony from five employees and three expert 
witnesses. Id. at 210. 
148 Id. at 237. 
149 The rate court set a fee of 2.5% for an ASCAP blanket license for AOL, 
RealNetworks, and Yahoo. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 559 F. Supp. 2d 332, 414–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated and remanded, 627 F.3d 
64 (2d Cir. 2010). 
150 Traditional TTTA licenses are set at rates of 0.9% for “music intensive,” 0.375% for 
“general entertainment,” and 0.1375% for “news and sports.” See MobiTV I, 712 F. Supp. 
2d 206, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. MobiTV II, 681 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2012). 
151 Id. at 249. 
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The Court agreed with both parties and ordered the rates to 
follow the three-tiered licensing system, calling it a “ready-made 
benchmark.”152 It sided with MobiTV, however, on the issue of 
revenue base: 
Mobi has shown that the value of the public per-
formance of the music at the retail level is indeed 
captured at the wholesale level, not just theoretical-
ly by the concept of derived demand, but also func-
tionally from the fact that the cable television net-
works principally generate their revenues by mea-
suring the number of subscribers for their pro-
gramming. To the extent that a channel’s content 
becomes popular among consumers, the seller of 
content demands a higher rate of compensation 
from advertisers and from purchasers of the con-
tent. And, Mobi’s payments to the cable television 
networks for the programming it distributes are dri-
ven by the subscriber data that Mobi tracks and 
conveys to the networks.153 
Although the Second Circuit had previously faulted the rate 
court for not relying on retail revenues, it affirmed the ruling in 
2012 by reasoning that MobiTV offered services that were suffi-
ciently differentiable from those discussed in prior cases.154 The 
Court relied heavily on MobiTV’s expert testimony and disre-
garded a similar rate it had set between ASCAP and AOL.155 Resul-
tantly, while ASCAP requested $41 million for a six-year licensing 
period, the Court awarded only $400 thousand.156 
B. BMI Versus DMX 
A few years later, the rate court was again faced with a licensing 
dispute between a PRO and new media music service. DMX Hold-
                                                                                                                            
152 Id. at 247. 
153 Id. at 246. 
154 Part of the court’s argument was that it would be too difficult to determine what part 
of a wireless customer’s fee could account for the music when the total fee was for a 
package of both audio and visual programming. See MobiTV II, 681 F.3d 76, 86–88 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
155 See RAYMOND J. DOWD, COPYRIGHT LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 17:9 (2d ed. 2014). 
156 Id. 
2016] “IT’S BEEN A HARD DAY’S NIGHT” FOR SONGWRITERS 517 
 
ings, Inc. (“DMX”),157 a commercial music provider that pre-
packages programming for sale to a variety of business establish-
ments, applied for an “adjustable-fee blanket license” (“AFBL”) 
from BMI for 2005–2012.158 An AFBL differs from a blanket li-
cense in that it allows the licensee to reduce its fee by also entering 
into direct licensing agreements with songwriters represented in 
the PRO’s repertory.159 The license has three components: (1) the 
“blanket fee,” which the licensee would pay to the PRO if it did 
not enter into any direct licensing agreements; (2) a “floor fee,” 
which it would pay even if it directly licensed all of the material 
from the PRO’s repertory that it performed; and (3) a “direct li-
cense ratio,” which reduces the blanket fee based on the percen-
tage of its total performances of the PRO’s music that is covered by 
any direct licenses.160 BMI and DMX were unable to reach an 
agreement on virtually all components of the AFBL, including rates 
for the blanket fee and the floor fee as well as for the scope of per-
formances to include in the direct license ratio.161 
The parties presented “strikingly different” benchmarks: BMI 
proposed a blanket fee of $41.81 per location whereas DMX pro-
posed $11.32.162 BMI based its benchmark on the rate of its tradi-
tional blanket license with Muzak, DMX’s main competitor, which 
was set at approximately $41.163 DMX calculated its benchmark 
                                                                                                                            
157 DMX serves business establishments such as retailers, hotels, casinos and fitness 
centers. See About Us, DMX, http://www.dmx.com/about [http://perma.cc/BUS7-
RVAY] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). DMX was acquired by Mood Media Corporation on 
March 20, 2015. See DMX Acquired by Mood Media Corporation, DMX (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.dmx.com/images/DMX_Mood_Acquisition_Announcement.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VDY7-CXU2]. 
158 Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc. (BMI v. DMX I), 726 F. Supp. 2d 355, 355 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
159 Id. at 355. The rate court did not have to determine whether DMX was entitled to 
the AFBL because it previously held that BMI was required to provide it to licensees as an 
alternative to the blanket license. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 
171 (2d Cir. 2001). 
160 The blanket fee represents the maximum in the range of potential fees to be paid to 
BMI and the floor fee represents the minimum. BMI v. DMX I, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 355–
56. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 357. 
163 BMI also had similar agreements with other competitors ranging from $41 to $45 per 
location. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc. (BMI v. DMX II), 683 F.3d 32, 39 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
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using several factors.164 DMX had entered into more than 550 di-
rect licensing agreements with music publishers, including major 
players Sony and Universal, at $25 per location.165 DMX argued 
that $10 of each direct licensing agreement represented music 
present in BMI’s repertory.166 Subtracting the $10 from the per-
location fee, and then applying a proposed floor fee of 11.7%, re-
sulted in a $11.32 per location rate.167 
The rate court decided that DMX’s calculation reflected a 
more appropriate benchmark and set the AFBL at $18.91 per loca-
tion for the blanket fee and $8.66 per location for the floor fee, with 
the direct license ratio to be calculated “using DMX’s off-premises 
performances as a proxy for all of its performances.”168 The 
Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, reasoning that the disparity be-
tween rates set by the rate courts and the rates PROs have histori-
cally obtained in similar agreements, “is of no moment given 
ASCAP and BMI’s longstanding market power and the industry’s 
changing economic landscape.”169 Despite the fact that BMI pre-
sented evidence that various other agreements with DMX’s main 
competitors were set at the $41 to $45 range and negotiated inde-
pendently, the rate court held that these were not reasonable 
benchmarks because they did not reflect a “competitive mar-
ket.”170 Much like in MobiTV I, the court relied heavily on the mu-
sic service provider’s proposal as support for its determination and 
set a rate less than half of what BMI had requested.171 Consequent-
ly, even the interim fees DMX was paying to both ASCAP and 
BMI were significantly reduced.172 
                                                                                                                            
164 DMX argued it was compensating BMI for two components of the relationship: for 
the right to perform works in the repertory, and for BMI’s value in assembling the 
repertory and offering a blanket license. See BMI v. DMX I, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 357. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 367. 
169 BMI v. DMX II, 683 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2012). 
170 See CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT LAW § 11:28 (2015). 
171 See Carly Olson, Changing Tides in Music Licensing? BMI v. DMX and In Re THP, 10 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 277, 283–84 (2012). 
172 See Todd Brabec, The Performance Right—A World in Transition, 31 ENT. & SPORTS 
LAW. 37, 38 (Winter 2015). 
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C. In re Pandora Media, Inc. 
Pandora, a customized Internet radio service, requested a 
TTTA blanket license from ASCAP for the period of 2011–2015.173 
In September 2011, the parties agreed to an interim rate of 1.85% of 
revenue as they continued negotiating.174 During the course of ne-
gotiations, however, an unprecedented event occurred. EMI, one 
of the largest music publishers at the time,175 warned it was consi-
dering withdrawing entirely from ASCAP in order to increase effi-
ciency by only using one institution for all digital licensing purpos-
es.176 Out of fear of losing EMI’s business, ASCAP modified its 
Compendium177 to permit members to withdraw their rights to li-
censed works in new media.178 ASCAP justified the decision based 
on the fact that licensees only needed to obtain both a public per-
formance license and a sound recording license when dealing with 
rights in new media.179 ASCAP also offered to handle the adminis-
trative side of collecting royalties for any member withdrawing its 
digital rights, given that the PRO already distributes royalties from 
similar licenses and has one of the lowest operating ratios in the 
United States.180 Ten days after the modification’s enactment, 
EMI both withdrew its digital rights and entered into an adminis-
                                                                                                                            
173 See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); About Pandora, 
PANDORA MEDIA, INC., http://www.pandora.com/about [http://perma.cc/Y9N7-KGJK] 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
174 Pandora pays over half its revenue to record labels for the right to license sound 
recordings. See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 333. 
175 EMI joined forces with Virgin Records in 2013, becoming “Virgin EMI Records.” 
Who We Are, VIRGIN EMI RECORDS, http://www.virginemirecords.com/who-we-are 
[http://perma.cc/C76W-BVPZ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
176 See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 333. 
177 Id. at 323 (“In addition to operating under a consent decree, ASCAP is governed by 
a series of internal rules and contracts. The most important internal rule set for purposes 
of this litigation is the ASCAP Compendium. The ASCAP Compendium can be modified 
by the ASCAP Board and reflects many of the important rules that govern ASCAP’s 
obligations to its copyright holder members and vice versa.”). 
178 Id. at 331. ASCAP had never before permitted partial withdrawal of licensing rights. 
Id. The modification defined “new media” services transmitting musical compositions 
“made available or accessible (i) exclusively by means of the Internet, a wireless mobile 
telecommunications network, and/or a computer network and (ii) to the public, whether 
or not, in exchange for a subscription fee, other fee or charge.” Id. at 337. 
179 Id. at 333. 
180 Id. at 337–38. 
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tration agreement with ASCAP.181 Pandora immediately negotiated 
with EMI for a licensing rate of 1.85% of its revenue, the same rate 
as Pandora’s interim agreement with ASCAP.182 
In July 2012, Sony also notified ASCAP that it would be with-
drawing its digital rights.183 Knowing Pandora could not survive 
without its catalogue of music,184 Sony argued in negotiations that 
if the company could pay fifty percent of its revenues to record la-
bels for sound recording licenses, it should be paying more for mus-
ical works.185 The parties negotiated a one-year deal for Sony’s pro-
rata share of an industry-wide rate of five percent.186 
When a third major publisher, Universal Music Publishing 
Group (“UMPG”), announced it would be withdrawing its digital 
rights, UMPG demanded an even higher rate—8% of Pandora’s 
revenue.187 Pandora eventually reached a six-month agreement 
with UMPG, agreeing to pay a rate of 7.5% of its revenue.188 
Meanwhile, Pandora had already initiated proceedings against 
ASCAP, arguing that the Compendium Modification violated the 
terms of its consent decree.189 The district court granted summary 
judgment, holding that the terms of the consent decree did not al-
low ASCAP “the right to permit the partial withdrawals of 
rights . . . and thereby acquiesce to a regime in which some music 
users could not obtain full public performance rights to works in 
the ASCAP repertory.”190 Consequently, EMI, Sony, and 
UPMG’s withdrawal of new media rights became inoperative.191 
                                                                                                                            
181 Id. 
182 The agreement also included a clause that the rate would decrease to 1.70% if 
Pandora could negotiate a better agreement with a catalogue equal in size or larger to 
EMI’s. Id. at 340. 
183 Id. at 342. 
184 In 2012, Sony was the world’s largest music publisher with approximately twenty-
five to thirty percent market share. Id. at 342–43. 
185 Id. at 343. 
186 Id. at 346. 
187 See id. at 347. 
188 Id. at 350. 
189 See In re Pandora Media, Inc. (In re Pandora I), No. 12 Civ. 8035 (DLC), 2013 WL 
5211927, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013). 
190 Id. at *7. 
191 See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 350–51. BMI followed ASCAP’s lead and 
modified its terms to allow members to withdraw their digital rights in 2013. See Broad. 
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In the rate court proceeding, ASCAP proposed a rate of 1.85% 
of the revenue for 2011–2012, 2.50% for 2013, and 3.00% for 2014–
2015.192 Pandora countered with a flat rate of 1.70% for all five 
years.193 Judge Cote, ASCAP’s rate court judge, set the rate at 
1.85% for all five years, holding that if ASCAP felt the rate was rea-
sonable for the first two years, “there is a presumption that that 
rate will continue to be a reasonable rate for the entire license pe-
riod.”194 
In all three cases, the rate court declined to use the benchmarks 
put forth by the PROs.195 ASCAP pointed out, on appeal to the 
Second Circuit in its rate-setting trial with Pandora, that Universal 
Music, Sony/ATV Music, and EMI Music had all independently 
negotiated direct license deals in excess of the judicially set rate of 
1.85%.196 Apple also negotiated a higher rate directly with ASCAP 
for its iTunes radio license.197 Nevertheless, these independently 
negotiated licenses were not deemed reflective of “arms-length 
willing buyer and willing seller agreements,” as ASCAP argued, 
and the Second Circuit confirmed the 1.85% rate.198 
III. PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE PRO CONSENT DECREES 
The music industry’s technological landscape is undeniably dif-
ferent today than it was at the turn of the century.199 Notable miles-
                                                                                                                            
Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc. (BMI v. Pandora), No. 13 CV. 4037 (LLS), 2013 WL 
6697788, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013). Pandora also challenged the modification and 
the Court ruled in the same manner as it did for ASCAP’s case, reasoning BMI’s consent 
decree forbade the PRO from allowing partial withdrawal of rights. See id. at *4. 
192 See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 320. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 355. 
195 See Brabec, supra note 172, at 39, 40. 
196 Id. at 40. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 39, 40; see also Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 785 F.3d 73, 78, 79 (2d Cir. 2015). 
199 See generally Callie Taintor, Chronology: Technology and the Music Industry, 
FRONTLINE (May 27, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
music/inside/cron.html [http://perma.cc/QD6V-ES85]; Rob Wile, Watch the American 
Music Industry Splinter into Bits over 30 Years in 30 Seconds, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 21, 
2014, 9:16 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/music-industry-evolution-chart-2014-
8 [http://perma.cc/8LUE-YM8N]. 
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tones include both the introduction of Apple’s iPod, which has 
been purchased more than 300 million times worldwide,200 and the 
advent of Internet radio, which is becoming increasingly pervasive 
as a form of music distribution.201 Popular services such as iTunes 
Radio, Pandora, and Spotify provide music consumers with access 
to vast libraries of songs, available through computers, tablets, and 
cell phones alike.202 Music is more accessible today than ever be-
fore, as online streaming services facilitate worldwide song sharing 
with relative ease and speed. Ironically, while the technological ad-
vances have created vast sources of revenue for both recording art-
ists and record companies, the same cannot be said for songwriters. 
As previously discussed in the Introduction of this Note, Linda 
Perry, the songwriter behind Christina Aguilera’s hit song, “Beau-
tiful,” only made a few hundred dollars despite the song playing 
tens of thousands of times over Pandora.203 Perry’s experience is 
just one of countless stories of compensation inequality with re-
spect to new media royalties. Aviici’s hit, “Wake Me Up!” is the 
most streamed song in Spotify history as well as the thirteenth 
most played song on Pandora.204 Despite the hit’s vast popularity, 
the work’s three songwriters have each made less than five thou-
sand dollars in domestic royalties since the song’s release in 
2013.205 
                                                                                                                            
200 See Jordan Crook, Apple Has Sold 300 Million iPods in Ten Years, 45 Million Just Last 
Year, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 4, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/10/04/apple-has-sold-
300-million-ipods-in-ten-years-45-million-just-last-year [http://perma.cc/2BMF-DM7Z]. 
201 See The Infinite Dial 2014, EDISON RES., http://www.edisonresearch.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/InfiniteDial2014-18-34-and-18-49-1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/G82C-CPHV] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015) (finding that 66% of 18–34 
year-olds in the United States listened to an online radio streaming service in 
January/February 2014; also finding Pandora was the most well known of the Internet 
radio services surveyed, with four in five 18–49 year-olds answering they were “aware” of 
Pandora). 
202 See About Pandora, supra note 173; About Us, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/
us/about-us/contact [http://perma.cc/D3NC-67ST] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016); see also 
Discover, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/music/discover [http://perma.cc/6MT3-B2YF] 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016). 
203 See supra note 8. 
204 See Aloe Blacc, Streaming Services Need to Pay Songwriters Fairly, WIRED (Nov. 5, 
2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/aloe-blacc-pay-songwriters [http://perma
.cc/L97R-85FV]. 
205 See id. As previously mentioned, Pandora pays over half of its revenue to record 
companies for licensing sound recordings. Pandora pays over half its revenue to record 
2016] “IT’S BEEN A HARD DAY’S NIGHT” FOR SONGWRITERS 523 
 
The direct cause of the industry-wide discrepancy in revenue 
received by record labels and recording artists in comparison to 
songwriters, lies within the DOJ-mandated PRO consent decrees. 
BMI and ASCAP’s decrees each last saw reform in 1994 and 2001, 
respectively.206 The propensity of new media has created new li-
censing challenges—challenges that these PROs have been unable 
to successfully adapt to due to the increasingly obsolete terms of 
their decrees. In order to change the industry standards to ensure 
songwriters are adequately compensated, these consent decrees 
must undergo comprehensive reform. 
A. Reform Rather than Terminate the Decrees 
As previously mentioned, the DOJ distinguishes between two 
types of consent decrees: “perpetual final judgments,” which do 
not have a date of termination, and decrees with “sunset provi-
sions,” which automatically terminate on a certain date.207 This 
change in decree logistics was “based on a judgment that perpetual 
decrees were not in the public interest” and accordingly, the DOJ 
has encouraged modifying or terminating perpetual decrees when 
justified by a change in circumstance or the ability to better serve 
the public interest.208 The Supreme Court has agreed with the 
DOJ, having held that when there is a “significant change in facts 
or law,” a consent decree warrants revision and the proposed mod-
ification must be “suitably tailored to the changed circums-
tances.”209 
When the PROs signed their decrees, vinyl records were the 
hot new technology while CDs, which now seem prehistoric in 
comparison to the iPod, were still decades from invention.210 There 
                                                                                                                            
labels for the right to license sound recordings. See supra note 174. Comparatively, the 
ASCAP rate court set the PROs rate at 1.85% of Pandora’s revenue. See supra note 194. 
206 See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15. 
207 Both ASCAP and BMI’s consent decrees are “Final Judgments” and consequently 
can only be modified or terminated in court. See ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra 
note 94. 
208 Id. 
209 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 368 (1992). 
210 CDs and CD players became available to consumers in 1982. See Hans B. Peek, The 
Emergence of the Compact Disc, IEEE COMM. MAG. 16 (Jan. 2010), http://www.research 
.philips.com/technologies/projects/cd/pdf/The-Emergence-of-the-Compact-
Disc_v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/7C5E-UXY6]. 
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has not merely been a “significant change” in technology but ra-
ther a complete technological revolution.211 In present times, the 
decrees do, however, continue to serve an important competitive 
purpose, and as a result should be modified rather than termi-
nated.212 Music licensing is both multi-faceted and incredibly com-
plex, and the PROs work towards ensuring songwriters license 
their musical works effectively and efficiently.213 ASCAP and BMI 
share ninety percent of the market and resultantly, any entity that 
wants to play popular songs without violating copyright law has to 
obtain a license from one, or likely both, of these PROs.214 That 
power, in and of itself, warrants consumer protection under the 
Sherman Act, which prohibits anti-competitive conduct.215 Fur-
thermore, the decrees continue to work well in respect to tradition-
al licensing needs.216 The blanket license, while controversial with 
respect to antitrust principles, is a longstanding recognizable need 
in the music-licensing marketplace.217 It is how the decrees restrict 
                                                                                                                            
211 See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 368; see generally Taintor, supra note 199; Wile, supra note 199. 
212 See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971) (“[C]onsent decrees 
are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on 
their precise terms.”). In order for decrees to remain precise and carefully negotiated, 
they must be revised based on changes in circumstance and environment—for example, 
the technological revolution that has taken place since the PRO consent decrees came 
into fruition. See id. 
213 As previously mentioned in Part I, it would be logistically impossible for songwriters 
to negotiate directly with each entity wanting to play their musical works. Thus, PROs 
play a crucial role in ensuring songwriters both get paid for the public performances of 
their works and can detect when copyright infringement occurs. See supra note 13. 
214 At a Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting on March 10, 2015, Mike Dowdle, Vice 
President and General Counsel of Bonneville International Corporation, voiced concern 
that if the decrees are terminated rather than modified, there will be no mechanism in 
place to protect fairness with respect to the potential for anti-competitive conduct. See 
John Eggerton, Broadcasters to Senate: Keep ASCAP/BMI Consent Decrees, BROADCASTING 
& CABLE (Mar. 10, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washing
ton/broadcasters-senate-keep-ascapbmi-consent-decrees/138663 [http://perma.cc/
K7RG-HVAG]. 
215 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). 
216 The propensity of rate court cases discussed in Part II occurred simultaneously to 
the introduction of new media services, namely Internet radio. The system remains 
unchanged, however, with respect to licensing musical works in traditional mediums: the 
circumstances in which the decrees were created to protect. 
217 See, e.g., Mary Katherine Kennedy, Blanket Licensing of Music Performing Rights: 
Possible Solutions to the Copyright-Antitrust Conflict, 37 VAND. L. REV. 183, 213 (1984) 
(discussing the conundrum courts face in “either promoting competition by invalidating 
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licensing arrangements for new media services that must be taken 
into consideration in light of reform. 
B. Allow for the Partial Withdrawal of New Media Licensing Rights 
New Media streaming royalties represent the most significant 
disparity in compensation between songwriters (for licensing the 
public performance of musical works) and record companies (for 
licensing sound recordings).218 In an attempt to remedy this discre-
pancy, ASCAP and BMI attempted to modify their terms to allow 
members to separately license new media rights.219 Consequently, 
they were both deemed to be in violation of their consent de-
crees.220 A modification allowing for the separate licensing of new 
media rights is precisely what the decrees need, however, in order 
to effectively adapt to modern music licensing. 
The decrees should include a clause that allows members to 
maintain traditional licensing agreements with the respective PRO, 
but with the potential to withdraw the right to license musical 
works in new media.221 Perpetuating an all in/all out rationale, re-
flected in the courts’ interpretation of the current consent de-
crees,222 could have a grave impact on the industry. Sony/ATV 
Music Publishing has threatened to withdraw from both ASCAP 
and BMI if the decrees are not soon modified to allow for partial 
                                                                                                                            
blanket licensing systems at the expense of copyright holders, or protecting copyright 
holders by upholding potentially coercive blanket licenses at the expense of licensees”). 
218 See supra note 11 (describing the difference between songwriters receiving 9.1% for 
“mechanical royalties” in comparison to less than 3% for public performance royalties 
through streaming in new media). 
219 See BMI v. Pandora, No. 13 Civ. 4037 (LLS), 2013 WL 6697788, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 19, 2013); In re Pandora I, No. 12 Civ. 8035 (DLC), 2013 WL 5211927, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013). 
220 See BMI v. Pandora, 2013 WL 6697788, at *9; In re Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at 
*7. 
221 The definition of “New Media,” as presented by ASCAP in its compendium 
modification, is appropriate for use in the proposed partial withdrawal clause. It provided 
that “New Media Transmission of musical compositions is made available or accessible 
(i) exclusively by means of the Internet, a wireless mobile telecommunications network, 
and/or a computer network and (ii) to the public, whether or not, in exchange for a 
subscription fee, other fee or charge.” In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
222 See BMI v. Pandora, 2013 WL 6697788, at *4 (holding BMI’s decree prevents partial 
rights withdrawal); In re Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at *7 (holding ASCAP’s decree 
prevents partial rights withdrawal). 
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withdrawal.223 A move such as this could threaten the viability of 
both PROs, given Sony’s significant market share,224 which in turn 
would threaten the livelihood of the individual songwriters and 
small publishing houses the PROs represent. These songwriters 
and small publishing houses may neither have the capabilities nor 
the resources to navigate the logistic and legal intricacies of music 
licensing.225 Furthermore, songwriters, unlike recording artists, are 
often not famous and do not make added income through activities 
such as touring and selling merchandise.226 Additionally, songwri-
ters do not have set salaries and benefits, like workers in other in-
dustries, and thus they rely on public performance royalties to 
make a living.227 Without songwriters, composers, and publishers, 
there would evidently be no new, original songs. 
Copyright owners are not restricted to an all in/all out licensing 
scheme like the current consent decrees provide for—rather, they 
are free to divide, assign, and license their rights either in full or in 
part.228 Modifying these decrees will not only make the decrees 
                                                                                                                            
223 See Ed Christman, Sony/ATV’s Martin Bandier Repeats Warning to ASCAP, BMI, 
BILLBOARD (July 11, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/
publishing/6157469/sonyatvs-martin-bandier-repeats-warning-to-ascap-bmi 
[http://perma.cc/BT8K-8GDM]. 
224 See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 342–43 (noting that Sony had an estimated 
market share of twenty-five to thirty percent in 2012); see also ASCAP Comment, supra 
note 50, at 17 (“Even the largest music publishers lack the information, resources and 
experience necessary to negotiate with each of the numerous broadcasters, Internet 
services, nightclubs, restaurants, and other users that regularly perform publicly their 
copyrighted works.”). 
225 ASCAP provided quotations from its members during its rate court trial with 
Pandora in support of its efficacy as a PRO. See In re Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 335–36 
(noting the “vital role ASCAP plays in protecting writers from the shark-infested waters 
of the music business.”). ASCAP is premised on equality between songwriters and 
publishers, thus songwriters fear that if publishers start collecting money for traditional 
licensing rights, the splits won’t be as fair as they are now (with a 50/50 between 
songwriter and publishers). Id. at 336–37. 
226 See, e.g., ASCAP CEO Elizabeth Matthews Testifies for Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, 
MARKETWIRED (Mar. 10, 2015, 10:35 AM), http://www.marketwired.com/press-
release/ascap-ceo-elizabeth-matthews-testifies-for-senate-judiciary-subcommittee-
1999036.htm [http://perma.cc/GQ4U-J5GK]. 
227 Id. 
228 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 201(d) (2006) (stating that rights afforded to copyright owners 
can be transferred separately). 
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more attune to modern music licensing but it will also harmonize 
the licensing process with federal copyright law.229 
Executives from Pandora argue that the same “corporate par-
ents” own many of the biggest publishers and record companies, 
thus the discrepancy in payment can be fixed internally, rather than 
through licensing reform.230 This argument fails to take into con-
sideration that both ASCAP and BMI represent many smaller enti-
ties, including individual songwriters and boutique publishing 
houses, both of which would not benefit from the proposed solu-
tion.231 Rather, songwriters would have to join a large publisher in 
order to ensure adequate compensation, which is simply an unfeas-
ible option for many.232 If Internet radio services are unable to ade-
quately compensate songwriters because the bulk of their revenue 
goes towards licensing sound recordings, that is a problem the In-
ternet radio services must solve in order to remain in business.233 
Songwriters should not suffer to enable their sound-recording 
counterparts to reap the benefits of licensing music through new 
media. 
C. Create a New PRO Equivalent to SoundExchange for Performance 
Rights 
Amending the consent decrees to allow for partial withdrawal 
of new media rights could allow for the creation of a new PRO—an 
entity dedicated solely to collecting and distributing the royalties 
generated by performance rights in new media. The DPSRA of 
                                                                                                                            
229 Id. 
230 See Bill Donahue, Pandora, ASCAP Spar In Senate Over Streaming Royalties, LAW360 
(Mar. 10, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/623498?utm_source=
rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=section [http://perma.cc/B5MN-F62V]. 
231 See, e.g., Whitney Broussard, The Promise and Peril of Collective Licensing, 17 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 21, 24 (2009) (“Generally, there is little overlap between the sound 
recording catalog of a major record label and the musical composition catalog of its 
publishing affiliate.”). 
232 A large music publisher, like Sony, would have no economic justification to 
represent a songwriter with, for example, only one published song. In contrast, ASCAP 
and BMI operate as non-profits and accept any artist with at least one published work. See 
ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15; BMI Consent Decree, supra note 15. 
233 See Donahue, supra note 230 (Chris Harrison, Vice President of Pandora, testified, 
“I understand that the disparity is a motivating factor to seek to modify the consent 
decrees, but at the end of the day, if Pandora is paying 50 percent to record labels and the 
solution is to pay 50 percent to the publishers, I can’t make that up on volume.”). 
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1995 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 leveled the 
licensing playing field by allowing copyright holders of sound re-
cordings to collect royalties for digital performances.234 A motiva-
tion for recognizing the digital performance right was to ensure art-
ists were fairly compensated, as music users increasingly began 
streaming music through the Internet, satellite, and cable services 
rather than purchasing it.235 The same consideration given to the 
digital performance right must now go to songwriters. SoundEx-
change, a non-profit PRO, was designated by Congress as the sole 
entity to collect and distribute digital performance royalties.236 An 
analogous entity should emerge to tackle the same needs for 
songwriters licensing public performance rights in new media. 
Establishing this new PRO could occur in a variety of ways. For 
example, SoundExchange could create a new division internally or 
spin-off a subsidiary that deals exclusively with performance rights 
in new media. Alternatively, ASCAP and/or BMI could put forth 
proposals for new entities, be it a sister company or subsidiary, 
tasked only with licensing performance rights in new media.237 The 
government would then have the authority to examine each poten-
tial candidate for the new PRO and select one as the sole entity des-
ignated by Congress to collect and distribute the royalties—just as 
it did for SoundExchange with respect to digital performance 
rights.238 
SoundExchange is efficient and effective, likely because “it is 
run by the people it pays.”239 Namely, the board consists of nine 
recording artist representatives and nine record company repre-
sentatives.240 Consequently, the non-profit’s operating costs are 
low and the payments it distributes to artists have seen an extraor-
dinary growth rate in recent years.241 Further, new media licensing 
                                                                                                                            
234 See Michael Huppe, “You Don’t Know Me, but I Owe You Money”: How 
SoundExchange Is Changing the Game on Digital Royalties, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 5 
(2010). 
235 Id. at 4. 
236 Id. at 5. 
237 The consent decrees would, of course, have to be amended accordingly to allow this. 
238 See Huppe, supra note 234, at 5. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
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is differentiable from traditional mediums in the sense that a ready-
made system exists for tracking performances: digital technology. 
The system SoundExchange employs for tracking song plays (or 
something substantively similar) can have the same positive effect 
for licensing musical works as it has had for licensing sound record-
ings.242 Creating an analogous non-profit PRO with the same prin-
ciples (such as being staffed by both songwriters and music pub-
lishers as well as utilizing existing play-tracking technology) but 
geared entirely towards performance rights, could ensure the gap in 
compensation inequality between recording artists and songwriters 
is appropriately bridged.243 
This graphic demonstrates the licensing system as it stands: 
                                                                                                                            
242 SoundExchange functions by collecting “tens of millions of lines of data” reported 
and processed monthly to track when songs have been played through digital services. See 
Our Work, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about/our-work 
[http://perma.cc/485A-ASWJ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015); see also Huppe, supra note 
234, at 6 (“SoundExchange does not invoice services. Rather, the organization relies on 
services to provide data about what they’ve played and uses these playlists to divide and 
distribute royalties according to what’s been played.”). 
243 See Drew B. Hollander, “Why Can’t We Be Friends?” How Congress Can Work with 
the Private Sector to Solve the “Digital Sampling Conundrum,” 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 229, 
272 (2014) (noting the efficacy of SoundExchange with respect to monitoring digital 
media royalty payments and proposing a similar system for monitoring “digital 
sampling”). 
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This graphic indicates how the system would change with a 
new PRO designated solely for licensing performance rights in new 
media: 
D. Replace the Rate Courts with Arbitration 
Creating a new PRO may help with new media licensing con-
cerns, but it won’t change the system as it stands with respect to 
traditional licensing. Although this Note has proposed modifying 
rather than terminating the consent decrees as they apply to tradi-
tional media licensing, one part of the current system must change: 
the rate courts. As representatives for BMI aptly wrote in the 
PRO’s public comments to the DOJ, the rate court system is “too 
slow, too expensive, and too legalistic to keep up with the speed of 
change in real-world markets today.”244 
The judiciary is not the appropriate venue for rate setting, par-
ticularly with respect to intellectual property licensing.245 Not only 
                                                                                                                            
244 BMI Comment, supra note 51, at 2. ASCAP similarly called the rate court system 
“unduly costly and time consuming.” ASCAP Comment, supra note 50, at 22–23. 
245 See Crane, supra 128, at 307 (“Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor 
rate regulators.”); see, e.g., Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(referring to rate setting as “a task [courts] are inherently unsuited to perform 
competently”); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust 
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is such a process extremely rare with respect to intellectual proper-
ty, “Courts are not institutionally equipped to study a firm’s cost 
structure in detail and figure out the difference between confiscato-
ry, reasonable, and excessive rates.”246 The government has itself 
analogously argued that judicial rate setting is inappropriate with 
respect to patents, reasoning that judicial regulation of the industry 
is “incompatible with our system of free enterprise.”247 
Rate court determinations are based on precedent rather than 
market force and consequently do not accurately reflect the fair 
market value of music.248 Neither consent decree defines the term 
“reasonable,” and thus the procedure for determining reasonable 
rates has evolved as a “flawed judicial mechanism.”249 Essentially, 
courts are making a best guess as to the value of music.250 The pe-
riod during which ASCAP and BMI modified their decrees to allow 
for partial withdrawal was the first time in decades that negotia-
tions reflected a willing-buyer/willing-seller transaction on the 
                                                                                                                            
Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 445 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The federal courts generally are unsuited to 
act as rate-setting commissions.”); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 
263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting “judicial oversight of pricing policies [that] would place 
the courts in a role akin to that of a public regulatory commission.”). 
246 Crane, supra 128, at 313. 
247 See Brief for the United States at 42, United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 
(1947) (No. 89). 
248 Rate court determinations are often backward-looking rather than forward-looking. 
Instead of contemplating new market trends and evolving business circumstances, rates 
are based on past judicial decisions and agreements—all of which have been negotiated in 
conjunction with the rate court system. See, e.g., Joan M. McGivern, A Performing Rights 
Organization Perspective: The Challenges of Enforcement in the Digital Environment, 34 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 631, 635 (2011). Consequently, the reflected rates are circular and an 
ill-suited representation of actual market value. This has lasting effects as the consent 
decrees require the PROs to license similar users with similar fees. Nor does it translate 
well to new media services, where the industry is constantly changing and businesses 
strive to create unique technological services. Offering comparable licenses may be 
justifiable for traditional mediums, but not for new media services which are constantly 
evolving. P.F. Chang’s, for example, uses music in the same way The Olive Garden does, 
but does Pandora offer an experience in exactly the same way as Spotify? The comparison 
of “similarity” is more complicated when it comes to new media services. Id. 
249 Frederick C. Boucher, Blanket Music Licensing and Local Television: An Historical 
Accident in Need of Reform, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1157, 1178 (1987) (arguing the rate 
courts are “contrary to the purpose of copyright and antitrust laws” and are “a costly, 
cumbersome, and artificial substitute for a free market determination of the value of 
music”). 
250 Id. 
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open market.251 The negotiations between Pandora and Sony, for 
example, demonstrated that licensing musical works in new media 
is a truly competitive business, worthy of reflective rates.252 Record 
companies and recording artists are amassing a fortune through 
licensing sound recordings while at the same time, songwriters 
struggle to make a living—all because finders of fact, rather than 
the open-market, determine their licensing rates.253 Furthermore, 
while licensees await rate court determinations (which often take 
years for litigation preparation, trial and appellate review), the li-
censees reap the benefits of “interim fees” which are set by the 
court based on any previous agreements between the parties.254 
The process incentivizes litigation, as licensees are free to abide by 
interim agreements and avoid negotiating while awaiting a judicial 
determination of the fee.255 Each day licensees and PROs wait for a 
judicial determination of reasonable fees is another day songwriters 
aren’t getting adequately compensated.256 Thus, a solution to this 
problem is to replace the rate court system with binding, expedited 
arbitration. 
Arbitration tribunals, unlike the rate court system, can adapt to 
meet time-sensitive deadlines by modifying and specifically tailor-
                                                                                                                            
251 See supra Part II.C. 
252 See supra Part II.C. 
253 Both consent decrees provide that once the rate court has determined a “reasonable 
fee,” the PRO must “offer a license at a comparable fee” to all other similar applicants 
who thereafter request a license. See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 15; BMI 
Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 9. 
254 See ASCAP Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that the rate court will fix 
an interim fee within ninety days of a licensee’s written request for a license); BMI 
Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 12 (stating that the rate court will fix an interim fee 
within 120 days of a licensee’s written request for a license). 
255 See McGivern, supra note 248, at 632 (discussing how the consent decrees allow 
licensees to delay paying PROs until the rate court has set a reasonable fee and 
rhetorically asking, “Why is ASCAP barred from exercising what is a copyright owners’ 
normal right to sue for infringement if usage and payment terms have not been agreed 
upon?”). 
256 See, e.g., ASCAP Comment, supra note 50, at 24 (noting that some licensees have 
remained on interim licenses for decades while awaiting rate court rulings); BMI 
Comment, supra note 51, at 20 (whilst awaiting rate court decisions, “many music users 
are able to perform BMI music for years without paying BMI, and it is not unheard-of for 
a user to go out of business before paying even a dime to BMI for its use of music”). 
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ing procedure.257 This is particularly attractive in commercial dis-
putes, such as music licensing negotiations, as both parties benefit 
from a quick determination of fees so the business relationship can 
proceed accordingly.258 Abiding by an expedited arbitration process 
could also eliminate the need for interim fees, thereby simplifying 
the exchange of funds between parties. Although an argument ex-
ists that the number of rate court trials has not been substantial 
enough to amount to replacing the system, a number of proceed-
ings have been terminated through settlements prior to litigation.259 
The expenses and time spent on these proceedings is nevertheless 
significant—particularly on behalf of the PRO who is likely en-
gaged in various other negotiation disputes and settlements con-
currently.260 
A troubling aspect about recent rate court decisions, such as 
the three discussed in Part II, is the disparity in defining “reasona-
ble” with respect to determining rates. Although the accepted 
precedent is to set a rate that represents “fair market value,” the 
rate court in In re Pandora I rejected examples of direct licenses as 
appropriate benchmarks and set the rate significantly below what 
other similar parties have reached through negotiation.261 Rejecting 
direct licenses as evidence of fair market value and consequently 
setting lower rates in the courtroom than in the open market incen-
                                                                                                                            
257 See DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON, JUDITH GILL & MATTHEW GEARING, RUSSELL ON 
ARBITRATION 1:5 (23d ed.). 
258 The Arbitration Act establishes federal policy favoring arbitration, particularly with 
respect to commercial disputes. See 9 U.S.C. § 1; see, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 
128 (2008) (“National policy favoring arbitration applies in state as well as federal 
courts.”); Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). The DOJ 
also supports arbitration in commercial disputes, particularly in technologically evolving 
industries. See, e.g., United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148 (D.D.C. 
2011) (the DOJ suggested non-appealable arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure for 
a decree enjoining a broadcaster and cable network from entering in a joint venture to 
provide video programming). 
259 See ASCAP Comment, supra note 50, at 24 (“There have in fact been a substantial 
number of rate court proceedings that have been terminated by settlement after 
significant expenses have been incurred in preparation for rate court litigation.”); see also 
Brabec, supra note 172, at 37 (detailing rate court cases that have terminated by 
settlement, the details of which are almost always kept confidential). 
260 See Brabec, supra note 172, at 37. 
261 Despite evidence of direct licensing agreements reaching up to three percent of 
revenue, the Court set Pandora’s ASCAP rate at 1.85%. See In re Pandora I, No. 12 Civ. 
8035 (DLC), 2013 WL 5211927, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013). 
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tivizes parties to rely on the judiciary rather than negotiate amongst 
themselves. In the interest of both judicial economy and inherent 
fairness to songwriters, the licensing process for musical works in 
new media must change. Allowing expedited, binding arbitration to 
replace the rate court system will result in awards that mold the 
market and significantly improve the rate-setting process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
ASCAP and BMI are currently bound by consent decrees that 
have not evolved to suit the modern music industry. The technolo-
gical dissemination of music is vastly different than it was when the 
PROs entered into their decrees and the industry has evolved, and 
continues to do so, at a rapid pace. Allowing outdated agreements 
to govern music licensing not only harms songwriters, but also the 
interests of the public at-large. The benefits of music are globally 
pervasive—songs can inspire happiness, encourage unity, and even 
support both mental and physical healing. If songwriters are not 
adequately compensated for their work, they will not be able to 
continue producing it. The Supreme Court has said, “The imme-
diate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘au-
thor’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to 
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”262 Record-
ing artists and record labels saw justice with the creation of digital 
performance rights, which had a lasting positive impact on the in-
dustry. A similar change must now occur with respect to licensing 
performance rights in new media. By burdening songwriters with 
financial uncertainty, the consent decrees stifle creativity rather 
than stimulate it. Amending the decrees to allow for partial with-
drawal of new media rights, creating a new PRO, and replacing the 
rate courts with expedited, binding arbitration will reform the sys-
tem to its benefit. The industry has evolved and so now must the 
decrees. 
                                                                                                                            
262 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
